Himalayan Research Institute - Lahore

Article 239(5) of Constitution

Muhammad Hashir Abbasi

Article 239(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan has remained the subject of discussion and criticism among legal scholars, particularly after the 26th and 27th Amendments. It is the provision of the Constitution that bars courts from questioning constitutional amendments. In its current wording, following the 27th Amendment, subsection 5 of Article 239 states that: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution and any judgment of any court, no court shall have jurisdiction to call in question any amendment to the Constitution on any ground whatsoever.” The interpretation of this wording suggests that Parliament has the authority to amend any provision of the Constitution through the prescribed constitutional process provided under Articles 238 and 239 of the Constitution, and that the amendment cannot be the subject of judicial review, even in cases where fundamental rights and other foundational features of the Constitution are at stake.

Although this interpretation of Article 239(5) can be seen as a narrow approach, it serves certain purposes. The first of these is the protection of parliamentary supremacy, as it restricts judicial interference in the constitutional amendment process. Article 239(6), separately, states that there is no limitation on Parliament's power to amend any provision of the Constitution. Similarly, Article 239(5) excludes judicial review of constitutional amendments, providing a strong degree of protection against legal challenges to Parliament's exercise of its amending power.

Although this provision of law appears to adopt a narrow approach, it can still serve certain purposes. For example, it can be argued that Parliament derives democratic legitimacy from elected representatives, so Article 239(5) may prevent judicial interference by unelected judges in decisions made through the prescribed democratic process. Similarly, it may promote certainty within the system; if constitutional amendments are repeatedly challenged, uncertainty could arise over the validity of institutional arrangements, public offices and constitutional reforms.

However, contrary to these potential benefits, this provision of the Constitution can bring different constitutional risks as well. The first and most basic drawback of granting such extensive protection to Parliament is that it can put the Constitution’s foundational arrangements at risk. Since Parliament itself derives its authority from the Constitution, an absolute reading of Article 239(5) may prevent courts from examining whether that authority is exercised in a manner that destroys the foundations of the Constitution. Similarly, it may endanger judicial independence; if courts are wholly barred from reviewing constitutional amendments, they would also be unable to examine an amendment that compromises judicial independence.

A relevant and recent example can be drawn from the 26th and 27th Amendments, which substantially altered Article 175A, concerning the composition and functions of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan. The 26th Amendment expanded the Commission's composition to include additional parliamentary representation, alongside executive members, while the 27th Amendment further reconfigured the Commission following the establishment of the Federal Constitutional Court. These changes have raised concerns about the balance between judicial and political influence in judicial appointments. It can be argued that such changes compromise the principle of judicial independence and raise questions about their consistency with Article 175(3), which provides for the separation of the judiciary from the executive. Subsequently, an absolute reading of Article 239(5) can also create the risk of autocratic legalism, where formal legal mechanisms are used to weaken democratic institutions.

A government with the required parliamentary majority could use its amending powers to weaken institutional checks while maintaining the appearance of legality. If those amendments are entirely immune from judicial scrutiny under Article 239(5), one important avenue for challenging such changes would be closed. A historical example of judicial validation of an extra-constitutional change can be found in Pakistan's 1958 martial law. On 7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the assemblies and imposed martial law, appointing General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. In the case of State v Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533), the Supreme Court accepted the new legal order by applying the theory of revolutionary legality, treating the successful seizure of power as a source of a new legal order. The judgment was later overruled in Asma Jilani v Government of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139). 

Considering the potential benefits and constitutional risks that come with an absolute reading of Article 239(5), the question of law arises as to how this provision should be interpreted. Although the alteration of Article 239(5) under the 27th Amendment strengthens the bar on judicial review and may promote certainty, its absolute interpretation would also strengthen the negative aspects of this provision. Absolute protection for Parliament cannot be justified if it creates the risk of destroying the foundational features of the Constitution. These foundational features have been discussed in the case of Mahmood Khan Achakzai v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 426), which identified federalism, parliamentary democracy and Islamic provisions as prominent characteristics of the Constitution.

However, the judgment did not establish an enforceable basic structure doctrine in the same manner as the Indian Supreme Court. Rather, it recognised these characteristics as important features while maintaining that Parliament could amend the Constitution under Article 239. This debate can also be seen in District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2015 SC 401), in which a 17-member bench upheld the 18th and 21st Amendments by majority. However, the judges delivered separate opinions on the scope of judicial review of constitutional amendments. Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja, in his separate opinion, argued that courts could review and strike down constitutional amendments in certain circumstances. Therefore, the case reflects differing judicial views on the limits of Parliament's amending power rather than a clear majority ruling establishing an unrestricted power to strike down amendments. 

However, in my opinion, to minimise the constitutional risks, Article 239(5) must be considered alongside the other provisions of the Constitution concerning fundamental rights, judicial independence and the federal structure. This consideration may help safeguard Parliament's power to make amendments while protecting the foundational features of the Constitution. But a difficulty in applying this approach arises because the current clause expressly states “notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution and any judgment of any court”, which gives it overriding effect in the event of a conflict with other constitutional provisions or court judgments.

This creates a serious obstacle to reviewing constitutional amendments, even when the parliamentary power to amend the Constitution is itself derived from the Constitution. Making the amending power effectively unlimited raises the question of whether the distinction between constitutional amendment and constitutional destruction can be maintained. Therefore, instead of excluding every possibility of judicial scrutiny, there should be space for judicial review in a very limited but effective manner. In such cases, the court would not examine whether an amendment is wise or consistent with the judges' preferred constitutional arrangement; rather, the review would be confined to serious allegations that an amendment destroys the Constitution's salient features. This would help establish a balance between parliamentary amending powers and the protection of foundational features. Here, the demanding threshold could require the challenger to establish that:

The features affected by the amendment can clearly be established as foundational to the constitutional scheme.

The amendment actually destroys that feature rather than merely modifying its institutional expression.\

The alleged destruction is supported by the amendment’s legal effect and not merely by speculation about politicaL motives.

This approach is closely related to the one adopted by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461), which established the basic structure doctrine. Under this doctrine, Parliament's power to amend the Indian Constitution under Article 368 does not extend to destroying its basic structure. Whether a similar doctrine can or should be applied in Pakistan remains a separate constitutional debate that I would leave for another time.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of The Himalayan Research Institute Pakistan (THRIP)

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Muhammad Hashir Abbasi is a final-year LL.B. (University of London) student at Lords Law College International, Islamabad. His areas of interest include constitutional law, jurisprudence, public law, and human rights law.

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