Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary

As the world witnesses a rapid expansion of transit connectivity, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has become a vital strategic alliance for Pakistan. With 7,200 kilometres of potential connectivity in multiple directions, this serves as a critical artery connecting multiple economic epicentres in one line: Moscow to Mumbai. With Pakistan joining the INSTC in 2024, its national and geopolitical ambitions are substantial. Despite higher trade volumes and investments in geopolitical networking, Pakistan’s posture of active engagement is susceptible to political instability, economic downturns, and infrastructural underdevelopment. Such domestic upheavals also fan geopolitical trust deficits. The debate over this project’s longstanding blueprint for economic resuscitation for Pakistan remains unresolved. With decades of financial turmoil and networking projects in Pakistan becoming either counterproductive or entirely abject, is INSTC worth the attention? Have we learned from our history’s big, unfinished regional promises and miscalculated cost-benefit political analysis? Addressing this cost-benefit nexus would require a step-by-step analysis of actors, strategies, interactions, and decisions.

In recent years, Pakistan-Russia relations have moved beyond episodic interactions to structural transnational partnerships. Transit operations are growing between the two countries. Despite not being close allies in global diplomatic recalibrations, the Putin administration appears to realise Pakistan’s geographical potential. Pakistan’s geographical proximity to the Arabian Sea and the ability to bypass hostile maritime chokepoints make the partnership strategic. Moscow’s ambition to broaden the BRICS ambit and Eurasian mega-network requires a diversified model of South Asian states in it. Co-opting the balance-of-power strategy involves integrating the mutual interests of Islamabad and Moscow. The Russian administration seeks multi-model maritime channels. Politically vulnerable points include Iranian ports, which limit geopolitical navigation. Islamabad acts as a suitable option for two reasons. First, low-cost routes to the Arabian Sea via Karachi and Qasim, with one semi-functional port at Gwadar, would reduce maritime fatigue. Second, Pakistan’s developing naval architecture, with reference to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Pakistan can offer CPEC integration into INSTC. However, it lacks the economic capability to do so. Moscow’s post-Ukraine War doctrine suggests investing in easy, adaptable, and short maritime corridors. Russia also aims to bypass Western allies and their magical thinking of isolating the Kremlin.

For Pakistan, contemporary international politics offers an unconventional lever to kick-start transit operations. Pakistan has growing ties with Central Asian Republics (CARs), Gulf states, and countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Pakistan's history of connectivity ties with CARs is also an essential element to enhance transit operations. This would allow Islamabad to complement the small-batch energy logistics of these regional actors. Pakistan can also provide suitable transmission lines and distribution frameworks via the Arabian Sea for the hydrocarbons of CARs. Also, flexible maritime-land energy flows to and from the aforementioned cluster of states are highly crucial for landlocked actors. Pakistan has a strong bargaining chip in its strategically vital position in Central Asia. It would involve a payoff of natural resources and natural geography between CARs and Islamabad through INSTC.

Nevertheless, transit operations largely depend on two subject matters. First, the regional situation of South Asia with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Second, the anchorage of infrastructural backing, CPEC, for laying down rails, roads, and pipeline networks. This is the large belief of the Shehbaz administration that CPEC will deliver what needs to be delivered. It highlights Islamabad’s magical thinking in its National Security Policy of 2022-2026. The cross-border insurgency and potential sabotage of roads or pipelines by terrorist networks add another layer of conundrum. It requires joint counterterrorism solutions through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

INSTC analysed Pakistan’s potential to open doors for landlocked CARs in the international market. Pakistan has several Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with CARs. These MoUs can extend from bilateral to trilateral connectivity agreements. With a shared understanding in the socioeconomic and diplomatic spheres, it is wise to invite investment in maritime architecture. Using Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) has been suggested by policy analysts on several occasions. Bringing in popular maritime investors known to all member states would increase investment. It will also settle security issues in the region with greater interconnectivity.

The CPEC question continues to hamper any significant progress. Longstanding national and international concerns about Chinese investments and deliverables in Gwadar have raised serious questions. The commercial value and natural outlook of Gwadar have significantly decreased in recent years. The promises and pitfalls of the project have created additional trust deficits and transit deliverables. The strategic military notions attached to Gwadar have undermined its economic potential. Transit operations might incur significant losses due to several political, security, and infrastructure challenges facing CPEC. Gwadar, often called ‘Pakistan’s Dubai’, has not yet realised half of its maritime potential. Any regional promises to include such ambitions in INSTC will create more challenges than opportunities. Such retrospection is vital for identifying who’s to blame and for making realistic promises. Also, Pakistan must look for alternative ports of Karachi & Qasim to kick-start its transit operations. Relying on Gwadar would increase tradeoffs, as uncertainty looms over for another fiscal year, to say the least.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of The Himalayan Research Institute Pakistan (THRIP)

_________________________________ 

Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary is a student of International Relations at the University of the Punjab, Lahore. With research interests in nuclear security, emerging warfare technologies, and deterrence dynamics of the Middle East and South Asia, he writes articles for the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR), Modern Diplomacy, and The Diplomatic Insight.